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HATTA AD CWJPEWRTIVES: THE KIDDLE WAY FOR INDVNESIA?
Benjamin Higgins
Indcnesia's achievement of independence in December 1,9 has been followed
by eight stormy years with eight different governments. Throughout most of
this period, Sukarno es President and lHetta as Vice President were the major
elements of stability in Indonesian government. Hatte became the symbol of
moderation es well es stability- during the succession of cabinets dominated
by Masjumi (T'oslem), right-wing PITI (Netionlists) and PSI (Socialist) parties,
he served both es mediator and buffer between the Cabinet and the Presi-
dent, who relied increasingly on left-wing Ntionalist and Comunist support.
The two Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinets and the Djuanda cabinet were supported
by this some faction, and were closely associated with the President. Under
these administrations, Hatte was unrble to play his traditional role. By
December 1956 he felt himself no longer rble to remain in the government and
submitted his resignation. Hatt's resignetion was widely regarded as a
threat to Indonesia's unity, and pressure has been exerted on him from
various quarters to return to the government, either as Vice President or as
Prime Minister of a new cabinet0  With the outbreak of civil war early
this year, the infant Republic faces its most severe crisis yet. Many people,
both in and out of Indonesia, are looking to Hatta, as a "middle of the way"
men, to lead the country out of its present dilemma and back to the path of
unity and progress.
Thus the publication in English of Hatta's book of essays has an interest
far beyond its immediate content. What manner of man does it reveal? What
is Hetta's program for Indonesia? What is the relationship of this program
to the current ccnflict?
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Hatta's Background
Indonesian political observers are fond of dividing Indonesian political
parties into three categories: Moslem, Nationalist, and Marxist. One of
the reasons for Hlatta's success as a middle-of-the--way moderator is that he
combines all three strains of Indonesian political thought in his own
ideology. He is a devout Hjoelem. His father was a well-known Ulama (Moslem
religious scholar) who gave him a thorough training in Islam. He was one
of the erly leaders of the Indonesian nationalist movement which culminated
in the revolution in 1945. As early as 1918, et the age of sixteen, he
became Treasurer of the young Sumatran Associetion, a local nationalist move-
ment. As a student in iolland, he was a leader of the Perhimpunam Indonesian
(Indonesian f ssociation); and by 1927 his campaign for Indonesian independence
was influential enough for him to be arrested by the Dutch and imprisoned
for six months. Seven years later, Hatta was arrested again and this time
was sent to a concentration camp in New Guinea. He joined Sukarno in the
Declaration of Independence on August 17, 1945, and became Vice President at
that time, During the crucial period of negotiations for independence and
until Agust 1950, Hatta served as Prime Minister of the new Republic, end
then became Vice President again.
Hatta also sheres with most of the educated Indonesian leaders a dis-
tinct Marxist bent, acquiring his Marxist views as a university student in
Holland. Hatte graduated with distinction from the leading Dutch high school(now Djakarta)
in Batavia/in 1921, and spent the following ten years studying at the
Rotterdam School of Commerce, earning the degree Doctorandus in Economics. 1
'"Dodtorandus" is a title given to students who have satisfied all require-
ments for the Doctorate except the dissertation.
Thus Hatta' s education is European and perticularly Dutch; during the forma-
tive years between the age of nineteen and the age of thirty, he was in
Dutch high schools and universities. Consequently, he approaches' qucstions
of economic and social policy with a European as well as an Asian point of
view.
Like other non-Communist Indonesian leaders, Hatta had his period of
flirtation with the Communist Party during his student days. latta's early
speeches and writings suggest that he thought of Indonesian Communists mainly
as Indonesian nctionalists. Gradually, however, he seems to have decided
that Communism was the wrong course for Indonesiaq While he has been con-
siderably less out-spoken than his fellow Sumatren Sjaffrudin, "Prime Minister"
of the rebel government, he could probably be clessed as an anti-Communist, while
retaining Marxist attitudes towards the Western World and capitalism.
There can be little doubt that Sukarno's proposal for "democracy with
leadership" after his return from Russia, Yugoslavia, and China uas the final
straw that led to Hatta's resignation. Not that either Sukerno's "conception",
or the struggle between Sukarno$ the left-wing Ntionalists and Communists on
the one hand, end the Moslem and moderate groups on the other was anything
new. Sukerno's proposal was really little more than a recommendaticn thet
Indonesia restore to the Presidency the powers conferred on that position
in earlier constitutions. The process of constitutional reform from the 1945
through the 1949 constitution to the present one of 1950 was one of pro-
gressive clipping of the wings of the President, and Sukarno had resisted
this process from the beginning. Moreover, the 1945 constitution also
See A. K. Pringgodiggo, The Office of President in Indonesia as Defined in
the Three Constitutions in Theory and Practice, Cornell Nodern Indcnesia
ject, 1957.
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provided for a Supreme Advisory Council not unlike the advisory council
involved in Sukarno' s "conception". At least as early as October 17, 1952,
the struggle between the two major factions became an open one. The "October
17th Affair" was an effort of a few Cabinet Ministers, backed by the Army,
to seize power Jn a coup d'etat, in order to overcome what they regarded as
the extreme and irrational nationalism of the Sukarno faction. The fall
of the two Ali Sastroamidjojo governments as a result of Arr opposition was
a reflection of the same basic conflict. But while the struggle between the
two factions, represented by Sukerno on the one hand and Hetta on the other,3
is one of long standing, the grcwing strength of the Communist Party gave it
a new significance. The Communists emerged from the elections of November
1955 as the fourth biggest party, with about a quarter of the popular vote.
They increased their share of the popular vote in the elcctions for the
Constituent Assembly, and local elections since indicate that the Communists
may have over thirty percent of the popular support of the country and
nearly half the popular support on the island of Java. In this situation,
Hatta found himself no longer able to serve as Vice President to a President
Cf. Justus van der Kroef, "Instability in Indonesia", Far Eastern Survey
April 1957, and "Guided Democracy in Indonesia", Far Eastern Survey, August
1957o James H. rYsberg, "The Indonesian Elite", ., March 1957; and Leslie
H. Palmer, "Sukarno, the Nationalist", Pacific Affairs, June 1957.
For a brief outline of this conflict, cf. Benjamin Higgins, Indonesia's
Economic Stabilization and Development, New York (Institute of Pacific
Relations), 1957, Introduction and chapters 3 and 4.
3At a reception at the Indonesian Embessy in Uashington in 1955 the wife of
the then Vilitary Attach4 asked me, "Who do you think will win the election,
Sukarno or Hatta?" Since neither Sukarno nor Hatta was running for office,
the question struck me at the time as being slightly naive. Not until my
knowledge of Indonesian politics deepened did I realize how apt a summary of
the major issues this question was.
who wanted broader powers for himself and Creater representation of the
Communists in the government.
At the same time, Sumatran though he is, Uitte has refused to give his
support to the rebels. If he is anti-Communist, why does he not support
the anti-Communist rebelliton, centered on his own home region?
The answer to this question can be found in the book under review. It
shows clearly that atta's attitude to "communism versus capitalism" is "a
plague on both your houses", and that he thinks of cooperatives as a "middle
way" between capitalism and communism, as mrny Europeans did during the 1920's
and early 1930' s. Let us turn, therefore, to the fletta "conception" of
the ccoperptive state as a middle way for Indonesia.
Cocoeretives and the Constitution
Article 38 -f the present (1950) Indcnesian constitution states:
1. The national economy shell be organized on a co-operative basis,
2. BrEnches of production of importance to the State and which
Vitally effect the life of the people shell be controlled by
the State.
3. Land and wter and the nttural riches contained ther'ein shall
be controlled by the State and used for the maximum prosperity
of the people.1
Hatta takes this trticle literally he considers it a goal and an
obliCation of the Indconesian people to establish a cooperative society. In a
1951 address he said,
As a notion which has struggled egainst imperialism and colonialism
for many a decade, we have the highest ideals concerning the funda-
mental principles of life. We want to see our netion live in proo-
perity and well-being, free from want. This ideal of ours is laid
'This is t1e rpio flol t tsle e rene ed ne inistri of Information.It Ts not C e transil ion o ee rcnbs an Iexr a
down in the Constitution: "The national economy shall be organized
on a co-operative basis." These words of the Constitution are not
only a reflection of one of our npticnal ideels, but also an injunc-
tion to do our best for its fulfillment. A national economy on a
co-operative basis is whtt we aspire to,.
He also indentifies the cooperative state with the Partjasila. He
writes,
In realizing our national ideal that"the economy should be organized
on a coopcrative basis,"we should not forget that our state is based
on moral principles, which are embodied in the Pantiasila, the five
principles: Divine Omnipotence, humanity, national consciousness,
denocrecy and social justice. (p. 76)
He also indicetes thpt the creation of a national economy along cooperative
lines is the proper outlet for Indonesian nationalism.
It has been only since the inception of the national movement,
starting with Budi Utomo, that the ideas of economic co-opera-
tion have begun to come to life in the Indonesien community. It
can therefore be said that it was the national movement which
stimulated the development of the cooperative movement. National
feeling became its guiding spirit. (p. 7)
Cooperation as a Development Technique
For Hatta, however, the organization of cooperatives is much more than an
expressicn of nationalism or the striving for an ideel; it is the appropriate
development technique for his country. Indeed, he states at one point
that "because the strength of a people economically weak can be brought about
only through the cooperative movement, cooperatives are a conditio sine qua
non as a base for the people's econoey" (p. 31). Cooperation, he argues, is
the only way to eradicate the netional "inferiority complex"; it alone is
"capable of topring the remnant of colonialism from the soul of our netion"
(p. W4).
1 From Vice-President Hatta's address on Indonesia's First Co-operatives Day,
July 11, 1951.
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As an example of whet cooperatives can do to develop the lndonesian
economy, he cites the possibility of organizing collectively owned smokehouses;
"If the raw rubber were smoked, it would be easy to produce at least fifth-
grade sheet rubber, for which there is P ready world merket, at a price up
to three times that of raw rubber", which the snallholder is now selling
(p. so). He refers to Denmark as a country which "by means of co-operative
orgrni zation", has "successfully raised themselves from a poor nation to one
of the most prosperous nets ons of the world" (p. 54).
Cooperatives and Gotong Rojon
At the seme time, Hatta believes thet cooperatives are a modern expression
of the ancient traditions of unanimity versus majority rule, mutual aid,
working together, the family-like society, and similer village traditions.
Mutual assistance, he says, is "second neture to our people" (p. 1). In the
Indonesian village "social co-operation is performed without regard to exact
economic calculations. . . This type of social intercourse makes for a strong
feeling of solidarity, the feeling of harmoniously belonging together" (p. 2).
At some points he seems to argue that the co-operative movement should be
supported because people who believe in it are nicer than others. In a co-
operative store "all weights and measures. . .must be true" (p. 35). Co-
operatives must "keep prices reasonable for the people", in contrast with
ordinary treders who "take advrntage of shortages and try to sell at the
highest possible price". (lie does not indicrte how cooperatives would over-
cone shortages when they occur, nor how they would ration short supplies
are
if prices/fixed below the market level.) The principles of the cooperative
movement requires thet "we must carry on a struggle in which we must be
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sustained by a purity of heart" (p. 97).
Htta does say that economic cooperation requires "individuality" as well
as the traditional "solidarity" (pp. 3-4), but he warns
that individuality should not be confused with individualism.
Individualism is an understanding or philosophy of living which
places the individual before society as we find in the economic
teachings of Pdam Smith. Individuality is the nature of an in-
dividual who is conscious of self-respect and has faith in him-
self. (pp. 3?-33)
Anti-Capitalism
The strength of latta's anti-capitalist sentiments is apparent throughout
the book. In 1951, Hatta was saying that privete enterprise is all right in
the short run, although it should disappear in the long run. "A realistic
economy policy", he meintains, "should be able to make a distinction between
long tem rnd short term economic policy. . . Cur long term economic policy
includes all efforts and plans for the tredual establishment of the Indonesian
economy on a co-operative brais." In the short run, however, the -overnment
must direct its attention to the immediete needs of the people: food, clothing,
and housing; and "as long as the state and the cooperatives are not yet
equipped to manage the national economy, in our community private initiative
will fulfill the functicn of developing the economy and providing a living
for many thousands of people of the have not category." Even then,however,
he added, "it is the duty of the government to protect the people's weak
economy against foreign economic oppression and to improve the system of
shcring the errnings" (pp. 39-40).
By 1956 private enterprise had sunk to the level of a necessary evil in
Ilatta's view. The best he could say for it was, "Whether it is desired or
not, those activitics not undertpken by the government or b, the cooperative
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movement in this period of reconstruction end development cre left to be taken
up by privrte concerns" (p. 100). However, "as there ere set up more and
more state enterprises, . . .and as the coopcrative movement develops, the
scope availrble to private enterprise will accordingly diminish and finally
disappeer entirely" (p, 101). He did add, however, that "this ultimate
development should not be brought about by draconic government regulations,
dogmetically formulated, but rether as a result of the predominance acquired
by state and cooperative undertakings."
Hatta regards the unexpected vigor of Indonesirn enterprise as a threat
to the long run goals and ideals of Indcnceians. Article 38 is imperiled, he
argues, because "there is an ever widening penetration of the idea of
national capitalism within the ranks of the influential political perties in
Indonesia. . .Apparently the pprty leaders have not, in this transitional
stege, sufficient authority to check this damaging trend" (p. 99). He admits
that "there was a time when the principle of laisses-faire. . .brought pros-
perity to the peoples of the world. . .(It) caused the collapse of all that
wras weak end destroyed backward production techniquestime and again causing
crises in unemploymcnt. However, the economic improvements and progress which
it had created outweighed the misery resulting from it." But, "capitalism
will run its course, and its historical mission will be over. Its further
development fr.n free competition into a system of monopolies, is no longer
in agreement with its original mission. The destruction it causes has become
greater then all the good and improvement it has brou;;ht" (pp. 86-87.). The
Marxist ring of these statements is unmistakable.
Another indication thet Ifatte still accepts the Eprxist view of capitalism
appears in his discussion of large scale cooperative industries. It is of
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course true, he stetes, that "lerge scale industries cannot be organized on
a cooperative besis in capitalist countries because the workers who would
become the pcrtners in these cooperatives do not own any capital." However,
he sees no reeson why Indonesia, with its whole economy organized on P
cooperative basis, should not be able to accumulate sufficient savings to
organize large scele enterprises on a cooperative basis (p. 80).
Throughout the book he treats ccoperatives as the antithesis of capitelism.
Lerge scale enterprise in cepitalist countries, he cays, are "to a lerge
extent still subject to a conflict of needs and interests between labor and
capital and, because of that, carries with it an overt or covert class
struggle. In the cooperative movement there is besically no class struggle"
(p. 24). At another point, he Loes so far as to state that "a private
concern with shareholders is an embodiment of class antagonism", while "in a
cooperative enterprise there cennot exist any class or class interests"
(p. 103). In r coopcrative system "wages are decided in line with the im-
portarice of the job and the amount of respcns.bility borne by an individual
in the running of the enterprise"; he implies that such factors exercise no
influence on wage determination in capitalist countries*
Among the backers of the rebel government in Sumatra are some of the very
"netional capitalists" that Hatta regards as a threat to Indonesia's ideals;
his failure to throw his support to the rebels may well be the result of
his distaste for this element of their support.
Cooperatives and Indonesia's Development Problem
Despite its wide rance cf netural resources, lnd.nesia has a complex and
difficult development prcblen, Two-thirds of the country's eighty-five
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million people are crowded together on the one smell islend of JEve, making
it the most densely populeted large area in the world. There is no hope
for the achievement of even reasonably high per capita incomes on Java
without moving much of the population !nto industry cn Java, or into industry
or larger scale agriculture on the outer islends. Either approach is expen-
sive. Most of the industrial potential--including plantations as industries--
is in the outer islands, especially Sumatra. Rfealization of this potential
will also require heavy investment of capital and skills. The estimates
made by the 1.I.T. Indonesia Project suggest thet Indonesia needs investment
of Rp. 12 to Rp. 15 billion per year to get over the hump to self-sustained
growth-about twice what has been invested in recent years or what is called
for in the current Five Yerr Plan. Netional income is about Rp. 1-C0 billion,
so these investment requirements correspond to the twelve to fifteen percent
of national income widely accepted as the capital requirements for a "take-
off" into economic growth.
'ow do these figures compere with the scale of the present cooperative
movement in Indcnesia? In 1956 (the latest year for which figures are avail-
able at time of writing) there were about l?,000 coopcrative societies in
Indonesia, with a membership of just over two million--less than ten percent
of the labor force. Total capital amounted to Rp. 394 million, less than
three percent of capital requirements. Total transactions--credits and
sales combined--were just over Rp. two billion, or some two percent of national
income,
Clearly, the cooperative movement cannot b( expected to make much of a
contribution to Indonesign economic development in the short run. Hatta does
not suggest that it can; "the cc-operative movement", he says, "calls for
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education end training which not only cannot be acquired in a short while
but must consume decades" (p. ?7). He recognizes that "the man in the street
cannot live by ideals cnly, he has not got the patience to wait for the
reelization of the co-operetive community of Indonesia, which can be estab-
lished chly Eradually and after a fairly long time, He wants action, cf any
kind, thet mrkes life less of a burden to him right now" (p. 38)o
But action of what kind? Here ietta feils us. He provides no program
for the short run. Foreign aid, he says (p. 31) can be effective only if it
works through the coop. retive movement. Yet Indonesia badly needs an effec-
tive program to get through the short run, if she is ever to enjoy the long-
run potential of her economy, organized in cooperative fashion or any other
wey. 1uch of the unrest in indonesia reflects the wide hnd deep dis-
appointment thrt Terdeka failed to bring prosperity in its wake; and the
struggle between Java and outer islands reflects a feeling that the central
government has not done what it could to build on the "growing points and
leading sectors" in the outer islands.
The government's failure to convert Indonesia's considerable development
potential into a rising standerd of living results from the inability of
Indnesian leaders to resolve their ideological conflicts. All governments
and all parties have expressed themselves in favor of "converting the colonial
economy into a nationel economy", but the concept cf F "netional econ my"
differed from party to party and from leader to leader; indeed only the
Communists hed a clear idea of what a "national" economy would be. All
perties also pay lip-service to the national goal of "orfanizing the economy
along cooperative lines" which was written into the Provisional Constitution;
but this goal also has lacked clear definition.
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iost lcaders agree that Indonesia is not to be developed en "capitalist"
lines. Rugf-ed individualism, free competition, privrte enterprise, had few
enthusiastic backers. They were assobiated in the minds of most Indonesiens
with imperialism, colonialism, meterialism, and a ruthlessly exploitative,
ferociously competitive, "devil-take-the-hindmost" approach to social organi-
zetion. Indonesians did nct want such "capitplism". So what was the economic
and social system to be? No one but the Comrunists was quite sure. Mean-
while, it was considered necessary to avoid making decisions on particular
projects--financing the Asahan VaWr scheme, disposition of the North Sumatra
oil properties--lest the decisions prove inconsistent with the ultimate
definition of social rnd economic eims.
Similarly, while everyone agreed that the political system was to be
"democratic", they also agreed thet it was not to be democratic in the
ordinary "Western" sense. No one but the Communists wanted a "People's
Democracy". It was to be an "Indcnesian" democracy, reflecting the spirit
(mutual aid and unanimity)
of gotone rojong and usjawarat dtes.,/and rejecting--as Sukarno put it-
"the principle that fifty percent plus one is right". But what exactly did
this mean? No one was quite sure, end the Constituent Assembly may teke years
to decide. Mcanwhile, it was felt that "as the twig bent so is the tree
inclined". No new institutions should be set up that m:*ght prejudice the
final outcome.
With such confusion regarding ultimate foels much time and energy of
national leeders was dissipeted in fruitless debate et the ideological level
r'eanwhile pressing economic issues absorbed the attention of only a handful
of leaders in the agencies directly concerned--the Bank Indonesia, the hlinistry
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of Finance, the National Plenning Bureau, the Industrial Development Bank.
Such questions as, "How can we best protect our dwindling foreign exchange
reserves? Where can we find capital for development projects? Should we re-
introduce a land tax? Shoul4 we develop Asahan or increase hydro-electric
capacity in Java?" could never be answered in terms of economic effective-
ness alone. At sothe point they always ran into an ideological or nationalist
issue. Whenever it was a choice between an effective stabilization or deve-
lopment policy and satisfying nationalist sentiments, nationalism won.
What Indonesia needs most from her leaders at this point is a lerge
dose of pragmatism--or, to use an expression conceived to describe the policy
which kept the Canadian Liberals in office for such an extraordinary length
of time-"ad hocery". Indonesia needs a leader with the common sense to
deal with the country's problems one by one, in a straightforward and
practical manner, and without too much appeal to one ideology or another.
This leader must also have the popular appeal to get support for such a
program. The importance of Hatta's contribution to the Indonesian revolu-
tion and to keeping the Republic afloat in its early years is beyond dispute.
The loftiness of his ideals and his personal integrity have never been
questioned. No doubt it will be necessary to bring him back into the govern-
ment in some capacity to provide a facade of unity. But judging from his
book, there is room for doubt as to whether Hatta alone can give Indonesia
the kind of leadership she needs in her present crisis.
